The international diffusion of new technologies: a multi-technology analysis of latecomer advantage and global economic integration by Richard Perkins & Eric Neumayer
The international diffusion of new technologies: a 
multi-technology analysis of latecomer advantage and 
global economic integration 
 




School of Geography, University of Plymouth, 8-11 Kirkby Place, Plymouth PL4 
8AA, England, richard.perkins@plymouth.ac.uk  
 
Eric Neumayer 
Department of Geography and Environment and Centre for Environmental Policy and 
Governance, London School of Economics and Political Science, Houghton Street, 
London WC2A 2AE, England, e.neumayer@lse.ac.uk 
 
1  The diffusion of modern, efficient technology has far-reaching consequences for the 
geography of economic activity, inequality and environmental quality. This article 
examines two popular yet highly controversial claims about the conditions most 
favorable to the rapid spread of new technology. The first states that latecomer 
advantage allows developing countries to diffuse new technology faster than 
developed countries. The second claim, widely articulated by advocates of neo-liberal 
policy reform, is that new technologies diffuse more rapidly where countries are 
“open” to international trade and investment. To investigate these claims we use 
event-history analysis to estimate the determinants of diffusion speed across a large 
panel of developed and developing countries for three very different technologies. 
These are: continuous steel casting, shuttleless textile weaving looms and digital 
telephone mainlines. Our results broadly support both propositions. Countries which 
adopt new technology later or have a smaller existing capital stock – characteristic 
features of developing countries – diffuse new technology more rapidly than countries 
that adopt earlier or have more installed capacity – two characteristics of developed 
countries. Trade openness is also found to influence the rate of diffusion positively for 
all three technologies. Yet, consistent with recent empirical studies, we fail to find 
support for the idea that foreign direct investment (FDI) accelerates the diffusion of 
new technology in host economies. The paper concludes by discussing the 
geographical implications of our findings.  
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2 The role of new technology in enhancing economic growth and environmental 
protection is well-established in the literature (Solow 1956; Anderson 1996; Porter 
1990; Rigby 2000; UNDP 2001). There is, however, less certainty about the 
conditions under which these technologies are exploited. This article scrutinizes two 
popular yet controversial claims about the circumstances most favorable to the rapid 
diffusion of new technology.  
  The first is that under conditions of late-industrialization new technologies 
diffuse more rapidly throughout the industrial structure. This, the argument goes, is 
because late-industrializers profit from so-called learning investments and are 
unencumbered by past investments in industrial capacity (Sharif 1989). Indeed, 
precisely because of these latecomer advantages, developing countries
1 are believed 
to be well-placed to catch-up with developed ones (Gerschenkron 1962; Abramovitz 
1986). A second claim is that new technologies diffuse faster under conditions of 
openness to international trade and investment. Growth in trade and investment is said 
to increase both the demand and supply of modern technology. Hence the argument, 
widely-articulated by advocates of neo-liberal reform, that market liberalization 
brings with it greater technological efficiency, productivity and competitiveness 
(OECD 1998). 
Such claims are of particular interest to geographers. If accepted, they raise the 
prospect of significant shifts in the geography of economic activity, income and 
environmental degradation over time as latecomer economies rapidly diffuse modern, 
efficient technologies as an integral part of capacity addition (Storper 1997; Rigby 
2000; Lall 2002). Moreover, they point to a specific geography of technological 
change, influenced by the policy regime and level of integration of countries into the 
global economy.  
3 In the present article we empirically investigate whether these claims are 
supported by recent historical experience and, in doing so, contribute to debates in 
economic geography about the dynamics of the world economy (Coe and Yeung 
2001; Dicken 2003; Yeung and Lin 2003). Using quantitative estimation techniques, 
we analyze whether the rate at which new producer technologies diffuse is 
significantly influenced by (1) latecomer advantage and (2) engagement with the 
global economy via trade and foreign investment. We recognize and readily admit 
that our large-sample, quantitative approach is not without its shortcomings. These 
largely stem from the limited availability of comparable time-series data for the large 
number of countries that comprise the community of potential adopters at the global 
level. Thus, data limitations mean that we are forced to ignore several institutional 
and policy variables – for example, bureaucratic quality (Booth 2001), science and 
technology policies (Lim 1999), market structure (Porter 1990), and so on – identified 
in more detailed, country-level research as influential determinants of technological 
change. Indeed, to the extent that we are only able to investigate a handful of potential 
determinants, our quantitative approach runs the risk of oversimplifying the highly 
uneven and contingent nature of technological diffusion. Data limitations also mean 
that our research relies on the use of several proxies, which provide only an indirect, 
and potentially ambiguous, measure of underlying drivers and barriers. And even 
where data are available, measurement errors in these data, mean that our econometric 
estimations are potentially inaccurate. Therefore, in line with other large-sample, 
quantitative studies, the results of our analysis need to be approached with a degree of 
healthy caution.  
At the same time, however, it is clear that a quantitative approach has 
particular strengths in the present context. By allowing us to investigate patterns of 
4 diffusion across a large number of countries, and moreover, years, we are well-placed 
to confirm and/or reject claims about the generic determinants of technological 
diffusion. That is, it has the advantage of generalizability, yielding insights that are 
more generally applicable across a range of different geographic contexts. This does 
not mean, of course, that we believe our approach is superior to recent small-sample, 
qualitative studies in geography (e.g., Ivarsson 2002; Hayter and Edington. 2004). In 
the end, we would argue that both approaches are complementary, each providing 
valuable, mutually-instructive insights into the complex process of technological 
diffusion at the global level. 
Geographers, of course, were at the forefront of quantitative diffusion 
research. Hägerstrand’s (1967) early work on understanding innovation diffusion in 
Sweden using simulation modeling is particularly noteworthy in this respect. 
However, commensurate with the “cultural turn” in economic geography (Barnes 
2001), geographers’ interest in formally modeling the diffusion of new innovations 
waned. Indeed, much of the recent quantitative research into the diffusion of new 
technology has been undertaken by economists, sociologists and business scholars. 
The present paper seeks to place geographers back at the forefront of diffusion 
research by investigating the spread of new technologies at the global level. Our 
contribution to the existing literature in this field is three-fold. First, we go far further 
than recent studies in analyzing latecomer advantage, both in terms of learning 
investments and capital stock effects. Although existing work by marketing scholars 
has examined rates of diffusion in both early-adopting and late-adopting countries, it 
has failed to establish the identity of these countries (i.e., are they developed or 
developing countries?). Nor, with one exception (Dekimpe, Parker, and Sarvary 
2000a), has the literature examined the impact of existing capital commitments. We 
5 attempt to address both of these gaps in the present article, thereby providing a more 
comprehensive and geographically nuanced analysis of latecomer advantage.  
Our second contribution is to investigate more fully the impact of the process 
of global economic integration on rates of technological diffusion. While economists 
have analyzed the role of international trade and, to a lesser extent, investment as a 
channel for the transfer, adoption, and diffusion of new technology, they have tended 
to do so individually, often using widely varying methodological approaches (e.g., 
Reppelin-Hill 1999; Gong and Keller 2003). By using a single estimation model we 
avoid this inconsistency and, for the first time, analyze quantitatively the comparative 
role of trade and investment in the geographic spread of new technology at the global 
level. 
Our third important contribution is that, unlike previous studies, the majority 
of which focus on a single technology, we examine patterns of diffusion for three 
technologies, selected because each is widely used in a different economic sector. 
They are: continuous steel casting, digital mainline telephone lines and shuttleless 
textile weaving looms. Given that spatial and temporal patterns of diffusion “…can 
vary greatly across technologies and industries” (Metcalfe 1997, 123), it is naïve to 
assume, as some previous analysts have done, that the results from single-sector, 
single-technology diffusion studies also apply across other technologies and other 
economic sectors. A multi-sector, multi-technology approach helps to overcome this 
problem of generalizability and so better corroborate or reject claims about the 
generic pattern and determinants of technological diffusion.  
The article is organized as follows. The next two sections elaborate recent 
claims about latecomer advantage and economic globalization. Next the findings of 
previous studies on international technological diffusion, late-industrialization and 
6 market openness are briefly reviewed. The data, method and estimation techniques 
employed in our research are then described and the results are presented. Finally, the 
article concludes by summarizing key findings, discussing their geographical 
implications and outlining important caveats. 
 
Technology and Latecomer Advantage 
Technologies do not spread instantaneously. Instead, diffusion is characteristically a 
long, drawn-out process, involving the adoption and application of new technology by 
a growing share of firms (Rogers 1995; Stoneman 2002). Theoretical models disagree 
as to why firms adopt innovations at different times. Epidemic models emphasize 
information (Griliches 1957). Certain firms are hypothesized to adopt earlier because 
they come into contact with, and learn from, adopters of the new technology before 
others. Economic models, on the other hand, predominantly emphasize firm 
heterogeneity (Ireland and Stoneman 1986). Firms adopt technologies at different 
times because they differ with respect to various organizational and environmental 
variables influencing the economic returns from adoption (Blackman 1999). Relevant 
factors here include the vintage of a firm’s capital stock, the level of human capital 
and the cost of locally-available credit. The important point is that firms which enjoy 
higher net returns to adoption are assumed to implement the new technology before 
their counterparts with lower net returns. 
  Applied in the context of international technological diffusion, both 
approaches generally predict that new technology will be adopted first in developed 
economies. These account for the vast majority of technological innovation and 
development (UNCTAD 1999). Geographical proximity with innovators and/or early-
adopters suggests that firms in developed countries are more likely to learn about the 
7 existence of a new technology first. A combination of skilled labor, high capital-labor 
ratios and low interest rates also means that they are likely to find it more profitable to 
adopt more advanced, productivity-enhancing technology than their counterparts in 
developing countries. Firms in developed economies are additionally better-able to 
absorb any losses arising from the adoption of new, innovative technologies owing to 
their superior financial resources (Lall 1992; Rogers 1995; Bell and Pavitt 1997; 
Todaro 2000).  
Yet, while many accept that developed economies may be best-placed to adopt 
new technology first, it has been suggested that developing countries late-
industrialization status means that they are well-positioned to diffuse new technology 
more rapidly. Underlying this belief are two key assumptions. The first is that 
latecomer (i.e., developing) countries can take advantage of technological advances 
made by first-comer (i.e., developed) countries (Gerschenkron 1962). This can be 
achieved, either directly, through FDI and technology purchases (imports, licensing 
arrangements, etc.), or indirectly, via knowledge spillovers (Bell and Pavitt 1997; 
Hayter and Edington 2004). Examples of the latter include imitation through reverse 
engineering and the transfer of know-how from the movement of people between 
firms (Saxenian 1996; Dicken 2003). Either way, the strong assumption is that 
developing countries can acquire modern technology innovated in developed 
economies, often at a fraction of the original research and development (R&D) costs, 
thereby leapfrogging many decades of technological progress (Teece 2000). 
Supporting this optimism, proponents point to Asian success stories such as Japan, 
South Korea and Taiwan, whose rapid post-war growth was rooted in the successful 
acquisition, imitation and copying of technologies originally developed in 
industrialized economies (Lim 1999). 
8 A second assumption is that late-industrializers are able to diffuse new 
technology throughout their economic structure faster than early-industrializers on 
account of their so-called “latecomer advantage”. Two sources of latecomer 
advantage are identified in the literature. One relates to the level of capital stock. 
Owing to their late start in industrializing many developing countries have yet to 
install significant capacity. This means that they can readily select between competing 
technologies according to their expected returns, and moreover, adopt the new 
technology as an integral part of capital expansion (IBRD 1992). Many developed 
economies, by contrast, have often already installed significant capacity. This so-
called “vintage capital” is known to be a source of considerable inertia in 
technological change (Clark and Wrigley 1997). Owing to the non-recoverability of 
sunk costs and/or low capital charges, firms in developed economies may actually 
find it more profitable to continue using existing, less-efficient technology than to 
invest in new, more-efficient plant and equipment (Metcalfe 1997). Especially in 
capital-intensive and/or network industries, characterized by large investments and 
long capital turnover times, past investment may considerably limit the scope for the 
diffusion of new technology (Soete 1985; Abramovitz 1986; Amiti 2001). It is 
therefore suggested that developing countries are better-placed than developed ones to 
rapidly diffuse technological innovations throughout their industrial structure. 
Another source of latecomer advantage derives from learning investments and 
increasing net returns to adoption over time. During the early stages of development 
and commercialization, new technologies are often costly, inflexible and unreliable. 
For this reason, take-up is characteristically restricted to a handful of innovative, risk-
taking adopters in developed economies with the financial, technological and 
managerial capabilities required to profitably master the technology. Expenditures by 
9 these firms reduce costs, improve performance, and make the new technology 
profitable amongst a much larger number of prospective adopters. Latecomers are 
assumed to be able to take advantage of this accumulated learning with the new 
technology resulting in a faster diffusion rate in developing countries (Grübler 1997; 
Rassekh 1998; Dekimpe, Parker, and Sarvary 2000a).  
 
Globalization, Neo-liberalism and Technological Change 
Early modernization theorists of the 1950s and 1960s were highly optimistic about the 
potential for developing countries to exploit their latecomer status. Through the use of 
Western capital and technology it was suggested that developing countries would 
rapidly catch-up with the industrialized nations (Rostow 1960). Not everyone, of 
course, shared this optimism. Advocates of dependency theory (Baran 1957; Frank 
1969), and its near relation, world systems theory (Wallerstein 1979), pointed towards 
structural barriers inhibiting catch-up in developing countries. For example, over-
reliance on a handful of primary goods exports, unequal terms of trade, and high tariff 
barriers on manufactures in “core” economies, were all implicated in continued 
poverty in the “periphery.” In fact, far from providing an opportunity for developing 
countries to escape their peripheral status, technology was seen as helping to sustain 
core-periphery divisions (Shrum 2001). The concentration of technological 
innovation, ownership and control in the core allowed developed economies to 
maintain their dominant position. Transfer of technology from core to periphery was 
possible. Yet it took place on unfavorable terms, and moreover, involved older plant 
and equipment far behind the high value-added technological frontier. The 
implication of dependency and world systems theory was that core economies would 
generally retain their technological leadership position while the majority of 
10 peripheral nations would remain technological laggards. There was little scope for 
genuine catch-up. 
  Variants of dependency and world systems theory enjoy continued popularity 
in certain quarters. Yet the past decade has witnessed renewed interest in the 
possibilities for catch-up through technology transfer, adoption and diffusion in 
developing countries. One reason for this optimism is the rapid and sustained pace of 
technological progress. The past three decades have witnessed the emergence of a 
range of production and consumption technologies that offer developing countries 
considerable promise in terms of value-added, poverty reduction and environmental 
protection (UNDP 1998, 2001). Indeed, many of the same flexible (“post-Fordist”) 
technologies that have underpinned spatial and organizational restructuring of the core 
economies (Dicken 2003), are often portrayed as providing new opportunities for 
catch-up in the periphery. Another reason for renewed technological optimism is 
economic globalization. According to an influential school of neo-liberal thought, the 
growing integration of national economies has considerably increased the scope for 
cross-national technology transfers, opening the way for the rapid global diffusion of 
advanced technology (OECD 1998; IMF 2000). 
The literature identifies two channels through which economic globalization 
accelerates the diffusion of new technology. The first is international trade. Trade 
allows countries to import modern technology that has been innovated or 
manufactured elsewhere. Indeed, it is suggested that a combination of saturated 
demand in home markets, and the strengthening of intellectual property rights 
legislation, has meant that firms in developed economies are increasingly willing to 
sell their technology to firms in developing countries. More generally, it is suggested 
that formal and informal interactions between trading partners promote cross-country 
11 learning about cost, technical performance, etc., of new technology. Again, these 
epidemic-type dynamics are said to accelerate the geographic spread of technological 
innovations, particularly between countries that are more open to trade (Coe, 
Helpman, and Hoffmaister 1997; Globerman, Kokko, and Sjöholm 2000).  
  Neo-liberal theorists additionally argue that trade increases the demand for 
new technology through intensified market competition. Imports of cheaper and/or 
superior goods may stimulate domestic firms to upgrade their technology in order to 
remain competitive. Indeed, limited import competition, arising from high tariff and 
non-tariff barriers, is widely blamed for the technological stagnation witnessed in 
developing countries such as India under import-substitution policies (Tharoor 1997). 
Likewise, faced with potentially high levels of competition in overseas markets, 
exporters may be encouraged to adopt the latest technological configurations. Thus, 
the existence of strong export incentives is said to have contributed to the dynamism 
of East Asian newly industrializing economies (NIEs), as domestic firms sought to 
compete in international markets by upgrading their technological base (Booth 2001). 
  A second channel through which globalization is thought to influence the 
transfer, adoption and diffusion of advanced technology is investments by 
transnational corporations (TNCs). TNCs generate, control, and manufacture the 
majority of the world’s advanced technology (Globerman, Kokko, and Sjöholm 
2000). Consequently, investments by TNCs in the form of foreign direct investment 
(FDI), are assumed to play a lead role in the international diffusion of new technology 
(UNCTAD 1999; Dicken 2003).  
As well as direct investments, the involvement of TNCs in host economies is 
thought to accelerate the diffusion of new technology indirectly by influencing the 
choices of domestic firms. Market competition, in the form of cheaper and/or better 
12 quality products, provides one mechanism through which foreign transnationals can 
prompt domestically-owned firms to adopt more advanced process and/or product 
technology. Another mechanism is technological spillovers. The presence of TNCs is 
widely assumed to result in the transfer of information, know-how, and skills about 
new technologies through demonstration effects, employee mobility, and supply-chain 
linkages (Globerman, Kokko, and Sjöholm 2000; Campos and Kinoshita 2002; Potter 
et al. 2002; Ivarsson and Alvstam 2004). 
  Based on these observations, proponents of neo-liberalism have argued that 
the diffusion of new technology will be faster in countries willing and able to interact 
with the global economy, via international trade and investment. Conversely, 
countries that are comparatively closed to these channels are likely to experience 
slower within-country diffusion rates.  
 
Other Determinants of Technological Diffusion 
Levels of development, latecomer advantages, and trade and investment openness are 
not the only factors hypothesized to influence the diffusion of new technology. The 
recent literature identifies three other determinants. 
The first involves a country’s geographical location. Recent empirical work 
suggests that diffusion is “geographically localized” (Globerman, Kokko, and 
Sjöholm 2000; Keller 2002; Milner 2003) in that a technology diffuses faster in a 
country where it is already more widely diffused in neighboring countries. Underlying 
these regional effects are contagion and contact with prior users or producers of 
technology. Geographic proximity, it is argued, facilitates interaction, information 
exchange and, hence, cross-country technological learning and imitation (Soete 1985; 
Ganesh, Kumar, and Subramaniam 1997).  
13   A second determinant is the level of education. A number of cross-country 
analyses report a positive correlation between levels of educational attainment and 
diffusion success (Caselli and Coleman 2001; Kiiski and Pohjola 2002). This is 
commonly explained by two factors. One is that well-educated workers are more 
likely to be aware of the existence of new technology. A second is that educated 
workers are more likely to be able to profitably master new technologies. 
The third determinant of adoption frequently discussed in the recent literature 
is social system heterogeneity. Empirical studies have found that new technologies 
diffuse more slowly in countries with more socially mixed populations (Takada and 
Jain 1991; Dekimpe, Parker, and Sarvary 1998). Again, this is commonly explained 
by contagion dynamics, and specifically, learning through social interaction. Actors 
who are similar in some way (e.g., ethnicity, age, etc.) are more likely to exchange 
information and imitate each other’s behavior. Conversely, dissimilar actors are less 
likely to communicate amongst themselves, reducing the prospects of learning and 
social emulation (Rogers 1995).  
 
The Empirical Record 
So far, the article has detailed two closely-related claims about the spatial and 
temporal pattern of cross-national technological diffusion, namely: (1) that late-
industrializing (i.e., developing) countries are able to diffuse new technologies 
throughout their industrial structure more rapidly than early-industrializing (i.e., 
developed) economies; and (2) that engagement with the global economy via 
international trade and foreign investment accelerates the diffusion of new 
technology.  
14 Clearly, both of these claims are appealing, particularly for developing 
countries. Yet a key question is whether they are supported by the empirical record. 
Case-study evidence from small-sample, qualitative research has so far yielded 
somewhat mixed results. The literature documents examples of several NIEs that have 
rapidly exploited modern technological advances as an integral part of capacity 
addition (Amsden 2001). Equally, however, the literature catalogues examples of 
countries whose efforts to diffuse modern technology have failed, resulting in an ever-
widening technology gap with leading developed economies, as well as a growing 
number of NIEs. For example, Lall and Pietrobelli (2002) describe how, despite a 
number of technology policy initiatives, institutions and intermediaries, Kenya’s 
“…technology and capabilities lag behind those of many countries in Asia and Latin 
America” (pg 55). Similarly, evidence that trade and investment openness have driven 
technological upgrading (IBRD 1993) is contradicted by examples of countries and 
sectors where market opening has paradoxically resulted in technological stagnation, 
particularly among small-scale domestic firms (Katz 2000). Unfortunately, owing to 
their reliance on data drawn from single countries, single technologies, and single 
policy regimes, it is difficult to determine which of these variables explain the very 
different results achieved in previous studies. 
Large-sample, quantitative evidence is less ambiguous. Yet, even here, 
important questions remain unanswered. Most studies agree that rates of diffusion are 
faster in countries that adopt the new technology later (Takada and Jain 1991; Ganesh 
and Kumar 1996; Dekimpe, Parker, and Sarvary 2000a). None of these studies, 
however, investigates the developmental status of these countries, and specifically, 
whether developing countries are, as widely assumed, late-adopters. Turning to a 
country’s general level of economic development, several studies find that higher 
15 income countries adopt and diffuse new technology more rapidly (Dekimpe, Parker, 
and Sarvary 2000b). Yet others find that income has only a weak or negligible impact 
on rates of technological diffusion (Wheeler and Martin 1991; Lücke 1993). Finally, 
with respect to capital stock, Dekimpe, Parker, and Sarvary (2000a) conclude that a 
larger installed base slows the diffusion of new technology, although it is worth 
noting that their study covers a single technology.  
More certain is the positive influence of trade on the diffusion of new 
technology. Wheeler and Martin (1992), Reppelin-Hill (1999) and Casseli and 
Coleman (2001) all find that rates of technological diffusion are positively correlated 
with measures of trade openness; Blackman (1994) estimates that diffusion rates for 
steel technology are faster in countries which export higher volumes of steel; and 
Gruber (1998) finds that trade liberalizations in the wake of the World Trade 
Organization’s Multi-Fibre Agreements are the single most important factor 
influencing the diffusion of textile technology within his sample of industrialized 
economies. 
In contrast to the abundant analyses of international trade, the role played by 
FDI in the transfer, adoption, and diffusion of physical technology has largely been 
neglected in the empirical literature (van Pottelsberghe de la Potterie and Lichtenberg 
2001). The only systematic evidence available is indirect and comes in the form of 
analyses of the relationship between FDI and economic productivity. Suffice to say, 
results from these studies are generally mixed. While several authors find a positive 
correlation between multinational corporations’ involvement and rates of productivity 
growth (Blomstrom 1986), others find a negligible, or even negative, effect (Aitken 
and Harrison 1999; Mencinger 2003). 
16   Considered together, then, the existing literature neither allows us fully to 
confirm nor fully to refute our two central claims about cross-national patterns of 
technological diffusion. Although it answers certain questions, it often does so only 
indirectly, and ignores some others altogether. Responding to these gaps and 
ambiguities in the existing literature, the present study attempts to provide a more 
conclusive analysis of technological diffusion, latecomer advantage, and global 
economic integration.  
Building on the approach adopted by several existing studies (Lücke 1996; 
Gruber 1998; Dekimpe, Parker, and Sarvary 2000a, b) we use quantitative techniques 
to analyze the determinants of technological diffusion across a large sample of 
countries (between 75 and 147, depending on the technology). However, as well as 
examining the impact of adoption timing on rates of diffusion, we undertake two 
further important tests of latecomer advantage. First, to probe objectively the intuitive 
claim that developing countries benefit from learning investments made in developed 
countries, we specifically investigate the identity of early-adopters and late-adopters. 
Thus, we establish whether late-adopters are, as widely assumed, developing 
countries. Secondly, to test the claim that a smaller capital stock allows developing 
countries to diffuse new technology more rapidly, we analyze (1) comparative levels 
of capital stock between developed and developing countries, and (2), the impact of 
capital stock on rates of diffusion. These additional tests allow us to scrutinize more 
thoroughly than before the empirical reality of latecomer advantage in developing 
countries. 
Furthermore, our study focuses on three technologies, rather than one, which 
is the norm amongst much existing work (Gruber 1998; Dekimpe, Parker, and Sarvary 
1998; Hargittai 1999). A particular advantage of this multi-technology approach is 
17 that it allows us to determine whether there are generic patterns and determinants of 
diffusion success across very different industrial sectors and technologies. Owing to 
the idiosyncratic nature of technological diffusion (Metcalfe 1997) single-technology 
studies have been unable to offer convincing generalizations. 
Our technologies comprise continuous steel casting, digital telephone 
mainlines and shuttleless textile weaving looms. The choice of these technologies was 
dictated by three considerations. First, the individual technologies are very different, 
both in terms of their capital requirements, technological complexity, and 
compatibility. For example, continuous casting equipment is less capital-intensive 
than shuttleless looms, and can be more easily incorporated into existing plant; while 
digital telephony, for example, is more technologically sophisticated than either 
continuous casting or shuttleless looms.  
Second, all three technologies are superior to older substitutes. Compared to 
conventional ingot casting, continuous casting is markedly more capital, energy, and 
labor efficient (Rosegger 1979). It delivers improved yield, i.e., a higher ratio of semi-
finished product to liquid steep tapped from the furnace, due to the continuity of the 
casting process and is particularly suitable for steel production in small and medium-
sized plants (Schenk 1974). Shuttleless looms allow textile manufacturers to achieve 
far higher levels of productivity than traditional fly-shuttle looms (Dumas and 
Henneberger 1998). They benefit from greater reliability and enhanced speed 
compared to the conventional shuttle looms (Smith 1974). And digital telephone lines 
offer a number of important benefits over analogue ones, such as more efficient 
channel usage and improved data reproduction (Barwise and Hammond 2002), 
potentially enhancing internet usage (Beilock and Dimitrova 2003). 
18 The final factor shaping our choice of technology was data availability. 
Reliable statistical data on the national take-up of all three technologies are not only 
obtainable for a large number of years, covering the period since first international 
adoption, but also for a large number of countries. Too many existing studies cover 
only “…a limited set of industrialized countries” and the “…inclusion of a larger 
number of countries (…) is extremely important (…) for generating empirical 
generalizations and normative insights for practitioners” (Dekimpe, Parker, and 
Sarvary 2000c, 55). Our study covers between 75 and 147 countries, depending on the 
technology, and is therefore much more representative than small-sample studies. 
 
Research Design  
The Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables for each of our quantitative estimations are of the event 
history type (Box-Steffensmeier and Jones 1997). They capture the time that elapses 
between initial adoption and “penetration” (see below) of the technology within each 
country.
2 Countries exit the sample at the time of penetration. If penetration does not 
take place, countries remain “at risk” of penetration until 2001, the end of our study 
period. Such observations are said to be right-censored. Time is measured in discrete 
rather than continuous units since the explanatory variables are only available 
annually. Initial adoption is the date when the new technology was first adopted in a 
country. 
Our definition of penetration depends on the technology in question.
3 In the 
case of digital telephone lines, penetration is taken as full uptake amongst potential 
adopters, i.e., all mainline telephone lines are digital. This is because there are no 
technical or efficiency reasons that would discourage switching all mainlines from 
19 analog to digital. To account for statistical error in the measurement of this variable, 
we take 99.5 per cent as full uptake. France was one of the early pioneers, starting to 
adopt digital mainline telephone lines in 1980. By 2001, 64 out of 147 countries in 
our sample had achieved full adoption. Data are taken from the International 
Telecommunications Union’s World Telecommunications Indicators Database (ITU 
2003). 
The corresponding definition of penetration for steel is 97 per cent of steel 
production by continuous casting technology. Although continuous casting is superior 
for the vast majority of casting applications, ingot casting is still required for the 
production of selected specialty steels and products with certain shape requirements 
(Freitag 1998). These requirements, however, typically account for a small percentage 
of total steel output. Consequently, we take 97 per cent as the benchmark for 
penetration of continuous casting technology, a ceiling currently achieved by most 
major steel-producing countries (see IISI 2002). Several developed countries started 
adopting continuous casting steel technology on a commercial scale in the beginning 
of the 1960s. By 2001, 52 out of 78 countries in our sample had reached the 
benchmark of 97 per cent penetration. Data are taken from various issues of the Steel 
Statistical Yearbook, published by the International Iron and Steel Institute (IISE 
various years) with early data complemented by Poznanski (1983). 
  The cut-off point we select for shuttleless looms is far lower. This choice can 
be explained by two factors. One is that shuttleless looms are known to have diffused 
far more slowly than the two other technologies. Although commercially available 
since the early-1960s, textile producers have proved surprisingly reluctant to adopt 
shuttleless looms. This was initially even true for weaving companies in developed 
countries (Smith 1974). Moreover, we expect traditional shuttle looms to play a 
20 significant role for some time to come. Despite suffering from lower levels of 
productivity, a combination of low profitability in the sector, high capital costs, long 
amortization periods, and the availability of second-hand equipment, means that many 
producers will resist the imperative to upgrade to shuttleless looms in the short- to 
medium-term (Smith 1974; Gruber 1998). We therefore consider penetration of new 
technology in the textile industry as the point when shuttleless looms account for 
more than 50 per cent of installed looms. Even at this level, only 30 of the 75 
countries in our sample achieve penetration by 2001. Such low shares can represent a 
problem for event history analysis. We therefore experimented with an even lower 
penetration level of 30 per cent, which raised the number of countries achieving 
penetration to 38, and our main results were little affected. Data are taken from 
various issues of the International Textile Manufacturers Federation’s International 
Cotton Industry Statistics (ITMF various years). 
  Figure 1 plots the percentage of countries in the sample achieving penetration 
for the three technologies against time since first adoption. 
 
Estimation Technique 
To estimate our event history models we employ the Cox (1975) proportional hazards 
model. It is a popular and commonly used estimation technique in the medical and 
engineering sciences (Collett 1999). Within the social sciences it is currently only 
widely used in economics, although it is becoming more popular in other disciplines, 
including geography – see, for example, Kim and Horner (2003) who estimate 
housing duration as a function of spatial and property-specific variables. Cox’s model 
assumes that there is a time-variant underlying baseline hazard of a certain event 
occurring at any point in time. In the medical sciences, the event is often death, in 
21 engineering it is characteristically the failure of an appliance, but in principle any 
event can be modeled. In the present context, the event of interest is the penetration of 
a technology within a country, as defined above, and what is modeled is the duration 
time until penetration. Explanatory variables raise or lower the baseline hazard by a 
proportional amount, which is why it is called a proportional hazard model. The 
estimated coefficients are not directly comparable to the ones from a simple ordinary 
least squares (OLS) or probit model, but their intuitive meaning is similar: A 
coefficient with positive sign raises the likelihood of penetration, whereas the 
opposite is the case for a coefficient with a negative sign. 
More formally, the hazard rate in a given year is the probability of penetration in 
that year, contingent on the country not having achieved penetration in the previous 
year. Let ρ(t) be the probability of penetration at time t (given that the technology has 
not penetrated in the country before t); this is the hazard of penetration. Denoting 
ρ0(t) the exogenous baseline hazard, which reflects those time-dependent factors 




Tx(t)),        (1) 
 
where x(t) is a vector of covariates shifting the baseline hazard, and β
T is a vector of 
parameters to be estimated. Notice that covariates change over time. 
A refinement of the Cox model is developed in this research, which, to our 
knowledge, is novel to the technology diffusion literature. Our stratified proportional 
hazard model allows the baseline hazards ρ0(t) to differ between strata of countries 
22 (although they are still assumed uniform within a stratum). Thus, for stratum i the 
stratified model can be written as 
 
ρi(t) = ρ0i(t)exp(β
Tx(t)).       (2) 
 
The stratified proportional hazard model is more flexible, allowing the baseline 
hazard to vary across, for example, income groups. It allows us to test whether our 
results are simply driven by strata-specific baseline hazards. It also controls for very 
crude differences across strata in determinants of technology diffusion that cannot be 
explicitly controlled for due to lack of data, for example, differences in factor prices 
(see below). For stratification we follow the World Bank classification of countries 
into five groups comprising low income, lower middle-income, upper middle-income, 
Organization of Economic Co-operation and Economic Development (OECD) 
countries, and, finally, other non-OECD high-income countries.
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For both the standard and the stratified Cox proportional hazard model, a partial 
Maximum Likelihood estimation is carried out, where the partial likelihood function 
is constructed as follows. Assume that all events of failure or, in our case, penetration 
can be ordered along a continuous time dimension. We want to calculate the 
probability that, contingent on an event taking place at time ti, it is country i that 
achieves penetration. The contingent probability that country i achieves penetration at 





























ρ .     (3) 
 
23 The numerator denotes the hazard at time ti that country i would experience 
penetration divided by the sum of all the hazards for all the countries who were at risk 
at time ti. Note that the baseline hazards cancel each other out as they enter both the 
numerator and the denominator. The partial likelihood function, one each for the three 
different technologies, to be maximized with respect to the vector β
T is then simply 
 
L = ∏
i t i i t ) ( ˆ ρ ,       ( 4 )  
 
that is, each observed penetration contributes one term like (3) to the partial likelihood 
– see Collett (1999) for more details. 
Event history models are relatively novel in the mainstream technology 
diffusion literature, but have been applied recently by marketing scholars, who 
similarly note their advantages over more traditional estimation techniques (Dekimpe, 
Parker, and Sarvary 2000a). Most existing studies have sought to estimate 
technology-specific diffusion functions based on the Bass, Gompertz, or logistic 
model (see the review in Dekimpe, Parker, and Sarvary 2000c). Compared to this 
literature, our use of the Cox model has two distinct advantages. First, the baseline 
hazard in our analysis is allowed to be very flexible, whereas logistic, Gompertz, and 
other functional models impose a certain diffusion shape on the technology. Although 
the idea of an S-shaped diffusion curve has emerged as a leading stylized fact within 
the diffusion literature, there is no guarantee that all technologies follow this or any 
other particular functional form in their global or regional diffusion (Rogers 1995; 
Grübler 1997). The fact that no specific functional form is required with the Cox 
model allows greater flexibility. Second, there is no need to estimate the underlying 
determinants of the baseline hazard, which depend, possibly in a complex way, on 
24 unobserved variables. The only requirement of the Cox (1975) proportional hazards 
model is that the explanatory variables raise or lower the baseline hazard by a 
constant proportional amount, an assumption, which can be readily tested. As a semi-
parametric model, the Cox model depends on less-restrictive assumptions than the 
fully parametric Exponential, Weibull, Gamma, or other models, which lead to more 
precise estimates only if the underlying probability distribution assumes a specific 
corresponding functional form (Collet 1999). 
All estimations are based on a robust variance estimator and observations are 
assumed to be clustered, that is, they are assumed to be independent only across 
countries, but are allowed to be correlated within countries over time. Since the same 
set of countries appear repeatedly over time in the sample, a failure to take clustering 
into account would underestimate standard errors. For handling tied times of 
penetration, that is, where the penetration of a technology occurs in more than one 
country in the same year, we employ the so-called Efron method, which is an 
approximation of the exact marginal likelihood. We experimented with various 
methods for dealing with ties, which showed that the choice of method hardly affects 
our estimation results, not least because apart from the digital telephone technology, 
there are not many ties in the sample. 
 
Explanatory Variables 
We use two sets of explanatory variables. One set consists of variables that are 
generic; while the other are technology-specific. Amongst the generic variables are 
the natural log of per capita income, the stock of FDI in the economy, and general 
trade openness. We also include two generic control variables: secondary school gross 
25 enrollment ratio as a proxy for the level of human capital; and ethnic fractionalization 
to control for the influence of social system heterogeneity.  
As a measure of a country’s general level of development, we use per capita 
income (GDP p.c.) in real prices of 1995 (IBRD 2003). In line with previous research 
we take the natural log of GDP p.c. due to its heavily skewed distribution. The value 
of the capital stock owned by foreign investors is measured by the stock of FDI 
relative to GDP (fdistock) using data taken from UNCTAD (2003b) and De Soysa and 
Oneal (1999). The trade (%trade) and school enrollment (%secondaryenroll) data are 
taken from IBRD (2003). General trade openness is measured as the sum of exports 
and imports divided by GDP. Ideally, we would have liked to include general export 
and import openness separately, but the two variables are too highly correlated with 
one another. We experimented with a simple dummy variable for membership in the 
World Trade Organization (WTO), but this is a very crude variable, which we found 
to be insignificant throughout and therefore have not included in the estimations.
5 We 
use Vanhanen’s (1999) measure of ethnic fractionalization to control for social system 
heterogeneity. The author bases his measure of fractionalization (ethnicfract) on three 
types of ethnic groups, defined by (1) racial differences, (2) linguistic, national, or 
tribal differences, and (3) religious differences. Vanhanen subtracts the percentage of 
the largest group in each type of ethnic group from 100 as a proxy for 
fractionalization in each group and then sums the resulting figures across all three 
groups. This variable is time-invariant and refers to information from the 1990s. 
Unfortunately, no time-series information are available for this variable, although it is 
worth noting that the extent of ethnic fractionalization is unlikely to vary much over 
time. Results reported below are very similar if we replace Vanhanen’s (1999) 
26 measure of ethnic fractionalization with two competing ones created by Alesina et al. 
(2003) and Fearon (2003). 
The technology-specific variables of greatest interest to our analysis are the 
year of first adoption, existing capital stock, and product-specific trade variables. The 
year of first adoption (adoptionstart) captures latecomer advantage in terms of 
previous learning investments. In order to capture vintage capital effects 
(capitalstock) we use the following, all measured in the year of first adoption: for 
digital telephone lines, the natural log of the number of mainline telephones; and for 
shuttleless looms, the number of installed weaving looms. For continuous casting, no 
capital stock variable is directly available, and so we take the natural log of steel 
production as a proxy for capacity. Data are taken from ITU (2003), ITMF (various 
years), and IISI (various years). Like Dekimpe, Parker, and Sarvary (2000a), we take 
the natural log of capitalstock to reduce the skewness of its distribution. 
In the case of both steel and textiles we use product-specific exports and 
imports data. For steel, exports are measured relative to production, and imports 
relative to apparent consumption (IISI, various years). Unfortunately, we are unable to 
use the same measure for textiles, since ITMF does not provide any production data 
and the Industrial Commodity Statistics Yearbook only covers a few countries (UN, 
various years). For this reason we measure exports and imports of textiles relative to 
the country’s general exports and imports, taken from the UN Commodity Trade 
Statistics Database (UN 2003).  
  The context for the adoption of telecommunications equipment is very 
different. Unlike either steel or textiles, the vast majority of output from the telecoms 
sector (i.e., telephone calls, etc.) is domestic and non-traded. Competition, 
demonstration, and/or information effects arising from product-specific imports and 
27 exports are therefore less relevant, even though the latest trend toward locating call 
centers in foreign countries might change this in the future. The UN Commodity 
Trade Statistics Database (UN 2003) does not contain information on 
telecommunication services and no product-specific trade variables can therefore be 
included. However, we might also expect general trade flows to influence the 
diffusion of telecommunications equipment. Trade could potentially increase the 
cross-country transmission of knowledge between adopters and potential adopters. 
For example, countries which export a large share of their output are more likely to 
learn about the benefits of new telecommunications equipment, through a variety of 
formal and informal linkages. In order to enhance national competitiveness countries 
more open to trade might also have an incentive to switch faster to digital 
telecommunications. 
The remaining technology-specific variable seeks to control for the influence 
of neighborhood contagion effects. For each technology we measure the average share 
of the new technology within the region relative to the global average share 
(%regionaldiffusion). The variable is measured relative to the global average in order 
to correct for the increasing global adoption of the technology over time. This ensures 
that the variables do not spuriously pick up a time effect. The classification of regions 
follows World Bank conventions: Northern America, Latin America and the 
Caribbean, Western Europe, Eastern Europe and Central Asia, Northern Africa and 
the Middle East, Sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia as well as, lastly, East Asia and the 
Pacific. 
A basic lack of data means that we are unable to control for technology-
specific factor prices of capital, labor, and resource inputs. Even general factor price 
data are not available for a large sample of countries. Yet it is worth noting that 
28 previous small sample studies have generally failed to find a significant effect of 
factor prices on rates of technological diffusion (Gruber 1998; Reppelin-Hill 1999). 
Also, stratification along income groups should partially control for some crude 
differences in these omitted variables. Table 1 provides summary descriptive 
statistical information for our explanatory variables for each of the three samples. 
 
< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
Results 
Our first step is to determine whether developing countries (1) adopt new 
technologies later than developed countries and (2) are characterized by a smaller 
capital stock. Results for our preliminary analysis are provided in table 2. It shows the 
25, 50 (median), and 75 percentile, as well as mean year of first adoption and logged 
level of installed capital for the group of developed OECD countries and developing 
countries. Half of the developed countries had first adopted continuing casting 
technology by 1969. It was not until 1984, however, that the equivalent share of 
developing countries had done so. By then the technology had been adopted by all 
developed economies (not shown in table). The difference in the average year of first 
adoption is 12.4 years, which is highly statistically significant. What this suggests, 
then, is that steel producers in developing countries first made use of continuous 
casting much later than their counterparts in developed economies, and lagged in fully 
diffusing the technology throughout their productive capacity.   
The difference between the developed and developing country median and 
mean adoption is about four years in the case of digital telephony. Again, this 
suggests that developing countries generally adopt new telecommunications 
29 technology later than developed ones, although the disparity is smaller than in the 
case of steel casting technology. The difference is least for the textile technology, 
amounting to one year in median and 2.3 years in mean comparison, which is still 
statistically significant, albeit only at the 0.1 level. Two factors possibly explain the 
comparatively small difference between developed and developing countries in 
adoption timing for shuttleless looms. One is investment costs. The high capital 
requirements of shuttleless looms means that producers in developed economies with 
installed capacity have been reluctant to upgrade to the new technology. Indeed, a 
number of firms have continued to use older, shuttle looms, despite their lower 
efficiency. A second factor is product mix. Shuttleless looms are particularly suitable 
for manufacturing the high-volume, standardized fabrics in which developing 
countries characteristically specialize (Smith 1974; Dicken 2003). Hence, despite high 
capital costs, producers in these countries have responded to market incentives by 
investing in shuttleless looms at an early stage.  
 
< Insert Table 2 about here > 
 
Taken together, therefore, the above suggests that developing countries have 
lagged in the adoption of new technology, although the degree of lag varies between 
the individual sectors. A similar pattern emerges in the case of capital stock. The 
mean and percentile value for the logged level of installed capacity is lower for the 
developing country grouping than the developed country one. This difference holds 
across all three technologies and is statistically significant throughout. In other words, 
developed economies generally have more installed textile, steel and telephone 
capacity than developing countries. Again, the difference between the two groups of 
30 countries varies between the three sectors. The largest difference is found in 
telecommunications and the least in textiles. 
That developing countries should lag developed countries little in terms of 
installed weaving capacity is hardly surprising. As a labor-intensive activity, and 
moreover, one in which many low-income countries possess a cost advantage, 
developing countries have characteristically added substantial textile capacity from an 
early stage of industrialization. Conversely, growing competition from developing 
countries has led to a contraction of textile capacity in a large number of developed 
economies, particularly in low value-added segments (Dicken 2003). The result is that 
the difference between developing and developed countries in installed textile 
capacity is comparatively small. The much larger difference in telecommunications 
capacity is equally plausible. Demand for telecommunications services is typically 
smaller in low-income countries. Ability to pay for the large investments required to 
build landline capacity is equally limited. It makes sense, therefore, that installed 
telecommunications capacity should be lower in developing countries than developed 
ones. 
The above characteristics with respect to (1) adoption timing and (2) capital 
stock are consistent with expectations. However, in order to determine whether they 
allow developing countries to diffuse new technologies faster, we must now turn to 
our event history estimations. Tables 3, 4, and 5 report the estimation results for steel, 
telecommunications, and textile technology, respectively. The first column of each 
table presents results under the assumption of a common baseline hazard, while the 
second column allows this hazard to be stratified according to income groups. We 
first report the results for the common baseline hazard. Wealthier countries diffuse 
new steel and telecommunications technology throughout their economic structure 
31 more rapidly than poorer ones. Penetration of textile technology, however, is 
unaffected by a country’s level of development. We find evidence of latecomer 
advantage for all three technologies. The later the technology becomes adopted in a 
country the faster it reaches penetration. We also find that the new technologies, i.e., 
shuttleless looms, continuous casting and digital telephone mainlines, each diffuse 
more rapidly throughout the economic structure in countries with a smaller installed 
capacity. Combined with our findings above (table 2) these estimations provide 
compelling support for the idea that developing countries’ late-industrialization start 
allows them to diffuse new technologies more quickly than developed countries. 
 
< Insert Tables 3 to 5 about here > 
 
Global economic integration also clearly drives diffusion. Countries which are 
more open in terms of steel imports and exports diffuse continuous casting technology 
faster than more closed countries. A country’s general trade openness, however, does 
not appear to matter. Shuttleless looms diffuse faster in countries that are major textile 
exporters. Yet, being a major textile importer does not have such an effect and, if 
anything, might negatively affect rates of diffusion. We have no product specific trade 
variables for telecoms. We nevertheless find that countries which are generally more 
open towards trade switch faster from analog to digital mainline telephones than more 
closed ones. 
The influence of trade is most likely rooted in competitive effects. Evidence 
suggests that exporters face strong market pressures to reduce product costs and/or 
improve quality. One way to achieve this is through investments in more advanced 
process technology which may explain the positive relationship between exports and 
32 rates of diffusion for continuous steel casting and shuttleless looms. Indeed, this 
interpretation is supported by empirical studies, which have found that export-
oriented firms in both the steel and textile sector have invested in modern technology 
in order to compete more effectively in international markets (Kher 1997; Amann and 
Nixson 1999). Competition from cheaper and/or better quality imports might have a 
similar impact to exports although, as evidenced by the case of textiles, potentially 
can have the opposite effect. This negative influence has previously been documented 
in several developing and transition economies following trade liberalization. Here, 
high levels of import penetration have reduced the economic viability of domestic 
enterprises, particularly in the small-scale sector, and hence their ability to invest in 
productivity-enhancing technology (Katz 2000).  
With respect to the other generic variables we do not find that a country’s FDI 
stock influences diffusion. This is perhaps surprising given the strong theoretical   
arguments about the economic benefits of inward investment in terms of, for example, 
positive spillover effects. The result, however, is broadly consistent with recent 
studies which have similarly failed to find an unambiguously positive correlation 
between FDI and productivity growth (Hanson 2001). A higher secondary school 
enrollment ratio is associated with a faster rate of diffusion for shuttleless looms. Yet 
the level of human capital does not influence the diffusion of the other two 
technologies. That secondary school enrollment only appears to impact take-up of one 
of the three technologies is intriguing. It is widely assumed that human capital is an 
important enabling factor in technological change (Abramovitz 1986; Bell and Pavitt 
1997). However, our result may simply reflect the supply-dominated nature of steel 
and telecommunications, whereby the capabilities needed to successfully operate the 
new technology are “embodied” in the technology. This reduces the learning 
33 requirements and hence the importance of a well-educated workforce in adoption. 
Ethnic fractionalization is statistically insignificant throughout. This contradicts 
several recent studies which have found that new technologies diffuse more slowly in 
more ethnically heterogeneous economies (Takada and Jain 1991; Dekimpe, Parker, 
and Sarvary 1998). Yet it is not entirely unexpected. While it is conceivable that 
ethnic diversity might inhibit the geographic transfer of “tacit” knowledge (Gertler 
2003), the idea that it should also shape the spread of embodied technologies is less 
compelling. 
We find evidence for all three technologies that the rate of regional technology 
adoption influences within-country diffusion. A higher share of technology adoption 
within the region positively influences the within-country diffusion rates of the 
technology. Similar regional contagion effects have been documented in the recent 
literature (Milner 2003) and are most likely the product of learning through 
interaction. Geographic proximity might be expected to increases the probability of 
coming into contact with, and learning from, regional neighbors who have already 
adopted a particular technology.  
Our results are little different if we allow the baseline hazard to be stratified 
according to income groups. The only differences are that the steel export variable 
becomes insignificant, whereas the FDI stock variable becomes statistically 
significant with the expected positive coefficient sign. General trade openness 
becomes very marginally insignificant for telecommunications (p-value 0.113), but is 
now statistically significantly positive for textiles. Textile imports are no longer 
statistically significantly negatively associated with the technology diffusion rate. 
Overall, therefore, the fact that the reported results change very little after 
stratification of the baseline hazard lends further support to the robustness of our 
34 statistical estimations. Tests of the proportional hazard assumption fail to reject the 




The purpose of the present article was to empirically scrutinize two questions about 
the international diffusion of new technology. First, are late-industrializing (i.e., 
developing) economies able to diffuse new technology throughout their economic 
structure faster than early-industrializers (i.e., developed economies) on account of 
latecomer advantage? And second, does engagement with the global economy 
through international trade and investment accelerate the diffusion process? 
Our motivations for this project were both academic and pragmatic. Neither of 
the above questions have been adequately addressed in the empirical literature (Saggi 
2002). Despite a long-standing tradition of diffusion research (Hägerstrand 1967; 
Smallman-Raynor and Cliff 2001) geographers have paid scant attention to the 
dynamics of technological diffusion at the global level. This is perhaps surprising. 
Future shifts in the geography of economic activity, inequality, and environmental 
pressure all significantly hinge on the extent to which different countries are able 
rapidly to exploit new technology. Precisely for this reason, advancing current 
understanding of the geographic pattern and determinants of international 
technological diffusion is an important research task, especially for geographers 
interested in the evolving and uneven dynamics of the global economy. 
Moreover, given the neo-liberal suggestion that market liberalization is the 
most effective policy for accelerating the diffusion process, it seems apt to investigate 
the role of open markets for trade and investment in the geographical spread of a 
35 range of new technologies. Our large-sample, quantitative approach is especially well-
suited to this purpose. Thus, not only is it capable of producing generalizable results, 
but, significantly, commands methodological legitimacy amongst mainstream neo-
liberal policy analysts.  
  On the first question our findings appear to offer considerable promise to 
developing countries. A higher level of development, proxied here by per capita 
income, may indeed provide developed economies with an advantage in the diffusion 
of new technology. Yet developing countries possess two advantages of their own. 
They generally adopt new technologies later. And developing countries are more 
likely to have a smaller capital stock. Both characteristics are widely believed to allow 
countries to diffuse new technologies more rapidly. Confirming these advantages, this 
study finds that countries which exhibit these attributes, i.e., late-adoption and small 
capital stock, diffuse new technologies faster. Most striking is the fact that, despite 
their very different characteristics, these patterns are consistent across all three 
technologies. 
  The degree of latecomer advantage enjoyed by developing countries varies 
between our three technologies. It is most pronounced in the case of continuous steel 
casting and least in the case of shuttleless textile looms. Whilst latecomer advantage 
may be generalizable, therefore, our results suggest that the prospects for rapidly 
diffusing new technology may be better in some sectors than others. In the case of 
textiles, producers in developing countries adopted shuttleless looms at a 
comparatively early stage, despite their high capital costs. This largely reflected the 
existence of a well-established textile industry in developing countries, and moreover, 
its specialization in mass-produced fabrics. This is a product sector where 
productivity-enhancing technologies such as shuttleless looms are of particular 
36 commercial advantage. Continuous casting is similarly a capital-intensive technology 
well-suited to high volume applications. However, during its early stages of 
commercialization, few developing countries were significant steel producers, and 
even less manufactured steel on a large-scale. Hence the economic incentive to adopt 
continuous casting in developing countries was comparatively low. Instead, it was 
only later when developing countries began to substantially expand steel capacity and, 
crucially, began high-volume steel production, that the economic benefits of the 
technology became apparent. An important consequence of this is that firms in the 
steel sector could take advantage of greater learning investments than their 
counterparts in the textile sector. What this suggests is that latecomer advantage is 
more likely to manifest itself in sectors where developing countries do not have 
significant existing capacity, and moreover, where the new technology is not involved 
in the production of goods in which developing country producers are already 
specialized.  
Our empirical estimations are more ambiguous with respect to neo-liberal 
claims regarding the benefits of market liberalisation and engagement with the global 
economy. Consistent with previous cross-country studies we find evidence that higher 
levels of product-specific imports, exports, and/or general trade openness are 
associated with more rapid technology diffusion. Of particular note, trade emerges as 
a statistically significant determinant across all three technologies, underlying its 
importance as a generic channel for the rapid diffusion of new technology. That the 
textile industry has historically been, and indeed continues to be, one of the most 
protected economic sectors, might partly explain why the general rate of diffusion of 
shuttleless looms is relatively low (Dicken 2003). 
37 Conversely, and confounding neo-liberal orthodoxy, our results fail to support 
the oft-made claim that TNC investments result in the more rapid diffusion of new 
technologies. The stock of host country FDI is statistically insignificant for all three 
technologies in the common baseline hazard model; and significant only in the case of 
continuous casting steel technology in the model with baseline hazards stratified by 
income groups. This, of course, is not entirely surprising. Recent research that has 
examined the impact of foreign investment on rates of productivity growth have 
reached similar conclusions (see review by Hanson 2001). 
Equally, however, our result for FDI may simply reflect two factors. First, all 
three sectors (steel, telecommunication, textiles) have historically been subject to 
limited inward investment and/or ownership by foreign transnationals. Instead they 
have been predominantly domestically-owned and operated. In fact, it is only very 
recently that our sectors have been the subject of FDI and, even then, levels have been 
comparatively low. Second, owing to lack of data our FDI measure is not technology-
specific, meaning that it may be poorly-suited to identifying sector-specific effects. 
Thus, while our study suggests that overall levels of foreign investment are 
unimportant, they do not allow us to discount the role of FDI in accelerating the 
diffusion of new technology altogether. 
Overall, therefore, our results are a source of optimism. They suggest that 
developing countries are well-positioned for the rapid exploitation of modern, 
efficient technologies as an integral part of capacity addition. Indeed, the fact that 
levels of secondary school enrollment emerge as a statistically significant factor in 
diffusion success for only one of our three case-study technologies, indicates that the 
limited human capital of developing countries may be less of a disadvantage than is 
often assumed. Our results also underscore the importance of open markets for 
38 international trade. Moreover, they suggest that trade liberalization, a policy embraced 
by the majority of the countries in recent decades, is likely to have enhanced the 
prospects for the geographic spread of productivity-enhancing technologies.  
Inevitably, a cautionary note is in order. The existence of latecomer advantage 
does not mean that developing countries will necessarily catch-up economically with 
today’s developed economies. Three factors count against developing countries in this 
respect. The first is that developing countries generally adopt later than developed 
economies. Ironically, whilst this means that developing countries generally diffuse 
new technologies faster, it is possible that by the time developing countries have fully 
adopted an innovation, developed ones will have already advanced to the next 
generation of technology. Developing countries may, in other words, be permanently 
caught in a cycle of catch-up by way of the fact that developed ones are better-placed 
to adopt new technologies earlier. Furthermore, owing to their enhanced ability to 
adopt new technologies early-on, developed country firms are potentially able to 
exploit  monopoly rents for a period of time. Late adoption can therefore be a double-
edged sword. It allows faster diffusion, but there are also advantages of being among 
the first adopters. 
Second, acquiring technology is only one, and possibly the most 
straightforward, stage of technological diffusion (Bell and Pavitt 1997; Gertler 2003). 
The other is operating the technology efficiently. Case-study evidence suggests that 
this is far more difficult, not least because it requires a sufficient pool of locally-
available technological capabilities (Lall 1992). Indeed, the absence of well-
developed technological capabilities is said to explain the failure of imported 
technology to achieve its design potential, or even fall into obsolescence, in many 
developing countries (Kher 1997). The important point is that differences in 
39 technological capabilities may hinder catch-up in resource efficiency, productivity 
levels, and income, regardless of the ability of late-industrializing countries to readily 
acquire physical technology (Soete 1985; Chen 1999; Felipe 2000). 
Third, while our study suggests that trade may be a fillip to technological 
diffusion, it needs to be remembered that many of the world’s poorest countries have 
found themselves largely excluded from international trade flows. Nowhere is this 
more starkly illustrated than in Africa which accounts for a mere 2% share of world 
imports and exports (UNCTAD 2003a). In fact, to the extent that trade reinforces the 
advantages enjoyed by more successful trading states, it may actually lead to further 
marginalization of the least economically dynamic developing countries.  
Although the primary contribution of this article is empirical we wish to end 
by reflecting on two methodological contributions. First, our study confirms the 
importance of multi-technology analyses of the diffusion process. Not only do such 
analyses reveal potentially instructive idiosyncrasies, but they help us to identify more 
generalizable patterns and determinants of international technological diffusion. There 
can be no doubt that our conclusions regarding latecomer advantage, for example, 
would be far more tentative if we were to have focused on the textile sector alone. 
Second, our study highlights the value of using event history models, and the 
stratified Cox model in particular, for estimating the determinants of within-country 
diffusion. The Cox model has advantages since it allows the baseline diffusion to be 
extremely flexible without a need to explicitly model its determinants, and the 
stratified Cox model allows the baseline diffusion to differ across groups of countries. 
Event history models offer an easy way to include the year of first adoption in the 
modeling and estimation of within-country diffusion. More ambitious simultaneous 
40 estimation of both first adoption and within-country diffusion would involve some 
very complex modeling and is left to future research. 
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41 Notes 
                                                 
1 The terms developing country, late-industrializer and latecomer are used interchangeably throughout 
the present paper. Whilst we recognize the potential problems of dividing states into “developed” and 
“developing” categories – not least, because it conceals a great deal of diversity within and between 
these two groupings over space and time – it nevertheless serves a useful analytic purpose in the 
present context. 
2 The use of country-specific initial adoption times is important since “…many prior studies comparing 
within-country diffusion curves have failed to adjust for a comparable time of origin across countries” 
(Dekimpe, Parker, and Sarvary 2000c, 65). 
3 Note, the idea of variable, technology-specific adoption “ceilings” is consistent with the empirical 
record which reveals that individual technologies have very different penetration levels (see Grübler 
1997). 
4 The OECD countries included in the sample encompass the US, Canada, Western Europe, Japan, 
Australia and New Zealand, but not Mexico, Turkey and South Korea as these were admitted to the 
club of developed countries for mainly political reasons in the 1990s. 
5 Note that events that affect all countries such as the conclusion of trade rounds in a certain year at the 
WTO are absorbed by the baseline hazard of the Cox estimator. 
42 Table 1. Summary descriptive variable statistics (steel, telecommunications and textiles) 
 
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
ln GDP p.c.  907  8.63  1.37  5.12  10.70 
adoptionstart 907  1973.34  8.77  1962  1992 
ln capitalstock  907  8.17  1.77  1.79  11.68 
steelexports 907  0.36  0.30  0.00  1.76 
steelimports 907  0.40  0.45  0.00  7.45 
%trade 907  55.60  34.25  8.96  352.85 
fdistock 907  10.32  10.53  0.00  85.87 
%secondaryenroll 907  76.27  25.80  8.97  160.11 
ethnicfract 907  29.11  30.07  0.00  149.00 
%regionaldiffusion 907  -0.36  13.15  -47.34  28.84 
          
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
ln GDP p.c.  1430  7.68  1.62  4.44  10.74 
adoptionstart 1430  1988.51  3.60  1980  1998 
ln capitalstock  1430  17.55  2.32  12.70  23.07 
%trade 1430  73.24  45.04  13.25  384.06 
fdistock 1430  16.95  20.29  0.00  271.57 
%secondaryenroll 1430  63.07  33.58  4.95  160.11 
ethnicfract 1430  40.90  32.34  0.00  149.00 
%regionaldiffusion 1430  -1.81  17.59  -45.77  33.10 
          
Variable Obs  Mean  Std.  Dev. Min  Max 
ln GDP p.c.  1227  7.50  1.43  4.44  10.71 
adoptionstart 1227  1977.76  3.10  1974  1999 
ln capitalstock  1227  9.09  1.70  4.70  13.35 
textilesexports 1227  0.03  0.05  0.00  0.46 
textilesimports 1227 0.03  0.03  0.00  0.20 
%trade 1227  52.21  23.87  6.32  177.08 
fdistock 1227  11.75  13.65  0.00  89.16 
%secondaryenroll 1227  51.43  26.48  4.28  108.49 
ethnicfract 1227  42.52  32.70  0.00  149.00 
%regionaldiffusion 1227  -4.52  12.69  -26.37  46.08 
 
43 Table 2. Summary statistics on first year of adoption and installed capital stock by country 
group 
 
Year of first adoption 
        
Country group 
(# of countries): 
Technology:  25% 50% 75% Mean   t-test stats. difference 
of means (p-value) 
OECD (20)  Steel  1964 1969 1974 1970.2    
Developing (58)  1980 1984 1987 1982.6    
           6.53 
(0.0000) 
OECD (23)  Telecommunications 1983 1986 1990 1986.3    
Developing (124)  1989 1990 1992 1990.1    
           5.37 
(0.0000) 
OECD (16)  Textiles  1975 1977 1978 1976.9    
Developing (59)  1976 1978 1981 1979.2    
   1.78 
(0.0796) 
    
Logged installed capital stock 
        
Country group 
(# of countries): 
Technology:  25% 50% 75% Mean   t-test stats. difference 
of means (p-value) 
OECD (20)  Steel  6.86 8.64 9.80 8.35     
Developing (58)  4.52 6.13 7.84 6.14     
           -3.83 
(0.0003) 
OECD (23)  Telecommunications 19.04 19.80 21.19 19.95    
Developing (124)  15.14 16.82 18.06 16.66    
           -7.55 
(0.0000) 
OECD (16)  Textiles  8.90 9.93 10.69 10.02    
Developing (59)  7.40 8.30 9.81 8.56     
   -3.11 
(0.0027) 
 
44 Table 3. Within-country diffusion of continuous casting steel technology 
 
  Common baseline hazard  Stratified by income groups 
Ln GDP p.c.  0.262  0.778 
 (1.92)*  (2.03)** 
adoptionstart 0.134  0.133 
 (3.69)***  (3.30)*** 
ln capitalstock  -0.574  -0.648 
 (6.46)***  (7.58)*** 
steelexports 1.003  0.315 
 (1.99)**  (0.55) 
steelimports 0.501  0.937 
 (4.83)***  (2.41)** 
%trade 0.005  0.005 
 (1.33)  (1.10) 
fdistock 0.007  0.014 
 (0.72)  (2.15)** 
%secondaryenroll -0.005  0.003 
 (0.49)  (0.34) 
ethnicfract 0.006  0.003 
 (1.47)  (0.73) 
%regionaldiffusion 0.025  0.026 
 (1.85)*  (2.04)** 
Observations 907  907 
# countries  78  78 
# penetrations  52  52 










* 0.05 < α <0.10 
** 0.01 < α < 0.05 
*** α < 0.01 
45 Table 4. Within-country diffusion of digital mainline telecommunications technology 
 
  Common baseline hazard  Stratified by income groups 
ln GDP p.c.  0.438  0.606 
 (2.32)**  (2.03)** 
adoptionstart 0.324  0.335 
 (4.61)***  (4.86)*** 
ln capitalstock  -0.340  -0.343 
 (2.85)***  (3.10)*** 
%trade 0.004  0.003 
 (1.97)**  (1.01) 
fdistock 0.001  0.001 
 (0.17)  (0.20) 
%secondaryenroll 0.005  0.009 
 (0.65)  (1.15) 
ethnicfract 0.002  0.003 
 (0.47)  (0.55) 
%regionaldiffusion 0.054  0.062 
 (5.45)***  (5.71)*** 
Observations 1430  1430 
# countries  147  147 
# penetrations  64  64 










* 0.05 < α <0.10 
** 0.01 < α < 0.05 
*** α < 0.01 
46 Table 5. Within-country diffusion of shuttleless loom textile weaving technology 
 
  Common baseline hazard  Stratified by income groups 
ln GDP p.c.  0.067  -0.032 
 (0.25)  (0.06) 
adoptionstart 0.176  0.153 
 (3.11)***  (2.42)** 
ln capitalstock  -0.344  -0.315 
 (2.03)**  (2.07)** 
textilesexports 13.341  12.115 
 (5.99)***  (4.74)*** 
textilesimports -11.774  -9.642 
 (1.83)*  (1.03) 
%trade 0.012  0.018 
 (1.40)  (1.89)* 
fdistock -0.011  -0.027 
 (0.61)  (1.20) 
%secondaryenroll 0.052  0.052 
 (3.70)***  (3.14)*** 
ethnicfract -0.007  -0.004 
 (0.54)  (0.31) 
%regionaldiffusion 0.033  0.027 
 (2.31)**  (1.64)* 
Observations 1227  1227 
# countries  73  73 
# penetrations  30  30 










* 0.05 < α <0.10 
** 0.01 < α < 0.05 
*** α < 0.01 
47 Figure 1. Percentage of sample achieving penetration since time of first adoption (Kaplan-












































































48 Appendix. List of countries included in samples. 
Steel 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, 
Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Honduras, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea (Rep.), Latvia, Malaysia, Mexico, Moldova, Netherlands, Nigeria, 
Norway, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Saudi 
Arabia, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Syria, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, 




Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, 
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, 
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, 
Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Dem. Rep., Congo, Rep., Costa Rica, Côte 
d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, 
El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, 
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, 
Kazakhstan, Kenya, Korea, Rep., Kuwait, Kyrgyz Republic, Lao PDR, Latvia, Lebanon, 
Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mali, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Moldova, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, 
Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, 
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Russian Federation, Rwanda, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak 
Republic, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, 
Syria, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Thailand, Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, 
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe,  
 
Textiles 
Algeria, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Finland, France, Germany, Ghana, Greece, 
Guatemala, Hungary, India, Indonesia, Iran, Israel, Italy, Japan, Kenya, Korea (Rep.), Kyrgyz 
Republic, Macedonia FYR, Madagascar, Malawi, Malaysia, Mexico, Morocco, Netherlands, 
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Pakistan, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, 
Senegal, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Switzerland, Syria, Tanzania, Thailand, 
Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, 
Zimbabwe,  
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